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ABSTRACT

Heroin has been a prohibited
substance in Australia since the early
1950s. Prohibition, combined with a
continued demand for the drug, has
spawned a profitable black market.
This paper presents a framework for
evaluating the net welfare effects of
heroin
consumption
under
prohibition, a task made more
difficult because of the co-existence
of addicts and casual users. It is
assumed that both groups enjoy
positive net benefits from their heroin
consumption, but the former impose
external costs which derive from their
addiction. Prohibition reduces heroin
addiction but also the surpluses of
both groups. Furthermore, whilst
prohibition may reduce quantity
related social costs, it may increase
price related social costs.

JEL classification number: D62.

"Social policy may be making the price o f heroin too high"

(Erickson, 1969).
I

INTRODUCTION

Heroin has been a prohibited substance in Australia since the
early 1950s. That is its im portation, production1, supply and
consumption are proscribed by law and punishable by sanctions
which include lengthy prison sentences. Of course Australia is not
alone in its fight against heroin as similar policies exist in many
other countries. The objective of this policy is to protect
consumers from a commodity which is addictive and considered
inherently dangerous. However, standard welfare theory suggests
that all consumers enjoy positive net benefits from consumption2,
in the form of consumer surplus3. Determining the welfare effects
of heroin consumption is complicated because of the existence of
casual users as well as addicts, and because of the effects of the
prohibition.
Casual users of heroin m ay be defined as consumers who can
control their use of the drug, perhaps going on an occasional
consumption spree. In many respects they may be regarded as
analogous to social alcohol drinkers. On the other hand addicts
m ay be defined as consumers w ith a behavioural pattern
characterised by an overwhelming preoccupation w ith the use of
the drug and the securing of its supply. From the point of view of
maximising social welfare, addicts are a complicating factor
because w hilst they may be benefiting personally from their
consumption of heroin, they m ay also be imposing costs on
society which derive from their addiction. Reducing the
consum ption of heroin by addicts may reduce these external costs
b u t will also reduce their surplus. If the consumption of heroin by
addicts is to be reduced by a policy of prohibition then the
consumption, and thus surplus, of casual users will also be
1

diminished. Furthermore, whilst prohibition m ay reduce total
heroin consum ption and so quantity related external costs, it also
results in a higher black market price for heroin and so may
increase price related external costs. Thus the net social cost
effect of the prohibition is a -priori ambiguous.
This paper presents a framework for evaluating the net
welfare effect of heroin consumption under prohibition, following
closely b u t modifying the work of Pogue and Sgontz (1989) for
alcohol. Section II presents the basic model which is then used to
establish the equation for determining the social welfare
optimising per unit price of heroin in Australia. Section IH
presents estimates of the various param eters involved and the
resultant optimal prices. Section IV discusses the sensitivity of
the results to changes in the param eter estimates whilst criticisms
and concluding comments are presented in section V.
II THE MODEL

Calculating the net social welfare effect arising from the
consumption of heroin under a policy of prohibition is a difficult
task. As a first step, suppose that the consumption of heroin is
not prohibited and there exists two types of heroin consumer,
addicts and casual users, w ho are identical in all respects except
for their dem and for heroin. In Figure 1 the dem and curve for the
typical addict is DA whilst that for the typical casual user is D N.
Suppose also that heroin is a homogeneous product available in
unlim ited quantities at a constant per unit price equal to long run
m arginal and average cost, p.
H eroin consum ption by casual users is assum ed to result in no
costs additional to the value of production and distribution.
However, that by addicts is assum ed to result in additional
internal and external costs. The former may include increased
m orbidity and private medical expenses, emotional and physical
2

pain, and lost income. The latter may take the form of injury to
others and losses of or damage to their property, increased social
welfare paym ents and reduced industrial productivity.
The dem and curve D a assumes that the addict correctly
accounts for all internal costs of excessive consumption, that is
the effect of heroin consumption on her well-being. These costs
are not welfare relevant. However, external costs resulting from
property losses, social welfare paym ents and reduced industrial
productivity are welfare relevant. For instance, increased social
welfare paym ents, although pure income transfers, are welfare
relevant if they result in increased rates of current or future
taxation. Browning (1987) shows that the marginal welfare cost
of taxes on labour earnings, whilst difficult to estimate
accurately, are nevertheless positive. Tullio (1987) reaches a
similar conclusion w hilst King and Rebelo (1990) conclude th at
the "...influence of taxation on the rate of economic growth has
im portant (negative) welfare implications" (p.s 126, brackets
ours). If, on the other hand, the government were to fund the
increased social welfare payments by reducing their financial
commitments to other program s, this w ould cause hardship to the
beneficiaries of these programs and so welfare losses w ould still
accrue.
Losses to industrial productivity due to heroin addiction are
also welfare relevant if wages are less than marginal productivity.
However, even if this were not the case, where positive
production externalities exist between employees, losses from
chronic absenteeism on the part of the addict may be greater than
merely the value of her marginal physical product.
The summation of these external costs are represented in
Figure 1 by the vertical distance between the p and (p+e)
schedules, such costs approaching zero at lower levels of
consumption. This magnitude, shown as e in Figure 1, is the
marginal external cost im posed on society at each level of
3

consumption. U nder these assum ptions the typical casual user
consumes qn per unit time whilst the typical addict consumes qa
per unit time and imposes on society a marginal external cost
equal to $YE per gram of heroin per unit time.
N ow suppose that heroin is declared a prohibited substance
and that, for simplicity, the cost of enforcement is negligible.
According to M iron and Zwiebel (1991),
There are several channels through w hich prohibition m ay
affect....consumption. First, prohibition increases supply costs, as
these m ust include the cost of evading detection and the p o te n tia l
cost of punishm ent...Second, prohibition

inhibits

consumer

access...by raising search costs, making quality dubious, and
increasing the possibility of being cheated. Third, prohibition
m ay create a prevailing sentiment that a certain commodity is
b a d ' or 'im m oral', thereby decreasing consumer demand. F in a lly ,
prohibition m ay deter some individuals' consumption because of
'respect for the law ' (p.245).

The first of these is a supply-side price effect. In Figure 1 this
increases the retail price of heroin by h per unit, to (p+h) per unit.
The other three effects are on the dem and-side, have been
summed and classified a deterrent effect, and so result in a
leftw ard shift of the dem and curves in Figure 1 to D a* for the
addict and D^* for the casual user.
A further im pact of the prohibition is to increase marginal
external costs. This is so because the higher, now black market
price of heroin increases the pecuniary costs of addiction and
m ay thus induce addicts to commit crimes to finance their
addiction. Becker (1968) has shown that crime is welfare relevant
as the estim ated value of resources used up in crime is not
identical to their net social cost because "...the cost of 'transfers'
like burglary and embezzlement excludes social attitudes tow ard
forced w ealth redistribution and also the effects on capital
4

accum ulation of the possibility of theft" (p.174).
Furthermore, prohibition of heroin supply is likely to generate
supply-related crimes. These could involve official corruption,
violence among heroin suppliers struggling for market domination,
etc. These are welfare relevant because they
"... lead to a loss of certainty and fairness in the adm inistration of
law, which is a real and significant cost" (Baldry 1993).

The prohibition may also result in greater losses of industrial
productivity as addicts spend more time looking for heroin on the
black market a n d /o r committing crimes to finance their
addiction, thus spending less time in legal productive activities.
These effects are represented in Figure 1 by an upw ard shift of
the marginal external cost curve to (p+e)p.
The first issue to be resolved is the net effect of the prohibition
on the consumer surplus of casual users whose surplus prior to
the prohibition is pAK. U nder prohibition the price effect raises
the retail price of heroin to (p+h) per unit w ith consumer surplus
falling to (p+h)FK. The deterrent effect reduces surplus further to
(p+h)DL. The price effect results in a loss of surplus equivalent to
FAR. The deterrent effect further reduces surplus by an amount
equivalent to FKLD. Both of these prohibition induced losses are
welfare relevant. However, in the interests of simplicity, we
assum e that the net im pact of the prohibition on casual users is to
reduce their consumer surplus by FAR only4. An analogous
argument can be m ade in the case of the heroin addict, the
welfare relevant loss of surplus in this case being MEP only.
The second effect which needs to be considered is the im pact
on total external cost, firstly due to the decreased heroin
consumption of addicts, and secondly due to the increased
marginal external cost curve. Prior to the prohibition, the addict
w as in equilibrium at E, imposing a marginal external cost on
society of $YE per gram of heroin consumed per unit time. The
5

prohibition moves the addict to C, with marginal external cost
now $IB. The prohibition has thus reduced total external cost by
(XYEB) - Ae. The shaded area Ae represents the partial increase in
total external cost, both consumption and supply related, due to
the prohibition induced price increase for heroin.
The net welfare gain from prohibition, W, thus equals the net
reduction to external cost less the reductions to the consumer
surpluses of casual users and addicts. That is, from Figure 1:
W = (BXYE)Na - (eNA* - (MEP)NA - (FAR)Nn

(1)

where N A is the number of addicts pre-prohibition, N A* is the
number of addicts post-prohibition and N n is the number of
casual users pre-prohibition.
Two further issues m ust now be considered. Firstly, to
estimate the size of BXYE in Figure 1 the total reduction in addict
consumption, qa-qa , m ust be known. The reduction due to the
price effect alone, qa-qa', can be estimated using the percentage
price change and the relevant elasticity. Figure 1 has been
constructed so that the reduction due to the deterrent effect
alone, qa'-qa*/ is exactly equal to that due to the price effect, qaqa'. In general this will not be the case, rather (qa'-qa*) = n (qa-qa')
w ith n >0S. Figure 1 depicts the special case w here n= l.
The second issue concerns the relative size of Ae. In general it
will be the case that Ae = m (BXZP) with m >0. That is, the
partial increase in external cost due to the prohibition induced
higher price of heroin will be some proportion m of the partial
decrease in external cost due to the prohibition induced deterrent
effect.
Given these simplifying assum ptions, equation (1) m ay be re
w ritten as follows:

6

W =E i[(h/p)riAQA]+E2 [(nh/p)riAQA]-m[E 2 [(nh/p)TiAQA]]0.5[(h/p) 1lAQA]-0.5h[(h/p)TiNQ N]

(2)

where Ej and E2 are the marginal external costs per gram of
heroin per unit time averaged over the change in consumption from
qa to qa' and qa' to qa* respectively, r| denotes the relevant own
price elasticity of dem and, QA=qaN A/ QN=qnNN/ and h, p,n and
m are as previously defined.
The first order condition for maximising W w ith respect to h
8 W / 8 h=Ei/p(TiAQA)+n(l-m)E 2 /p(riAQA-

h/p(riA Q A )-h/p(riN Q N )=0

(3)

Solving (3) for h / p gives the welfare maximising ad valorem
price increase for heroin under a policy of prohibition:
h /p = [E i+ n (l-m )E 2 ) / p] [1 /1 + (nNQN / “Ha Q a )

(4)

III ESTIMATING THE OPTIMAL PRICE OF HEROIN IN
AUSTRALIA

In order to calculate (p+h) from (4) w e need estimates of p, n, m,
E l, E 2 , 'Hn/'Ha arid Q n /Q a - Unfortunately little reliable d a ta
exists w ith regard to heroin under prohibition because of the
clandestine nature of the market. Hence the param eter estimates
discussed below and presented in Table 1 should be treated w ith
considerable caution.

7

Table 1
O ptim al Prices of Heroin U nder Prohibition and
A lternate Param eter Assum ptions
p

n

m

Ei

e

12

0.1

0.1

20

12

0.1

0.1

20

12

0.1

0.1

12

0.1

1

12

0.1

12

e ln /e la

Q n /Q a

H /P

H+P

20

1

0.31

1.39

28.64

20

2

0.31

1.12

25.46

20

20

4

0.31

0.81

21.73

20

20

1

0.31

1.27

27.27

1

20

20

2

0.31

1.03

24.35

0.1

1

20

20

4

0.31

0.74

20.93

12

0.1

10

20

20

1

0.31

0.13

13.53

12

0.1

10

20

20

2

0.31

0.10

13.23

12

0.1

10

20

20

4

0.31

0.07

12.89

12

1

0.1

20

20

1

0.31

2.42

41.01

12

1

0.1

20

20

2

0.31

1.95

35.46

12

1

0.1

20

20

4

0.31

1.41

28.96

12

1

1

20

20

1

0.31

1.27

27.27

12

1

1

20

20

2

0.31

1.03

24.35

12

1

1

20

20

4

0.31

0.74

20.93

12

1

10

20

20

1

0.31

-10.18

-110.14

12

1

10

20

20

2

0.31

-8.23

-86.77

2

12

1

10

20

20

4

0.31

-5.95

-59.43

12

10

0.1

20

20

1

0.31

12.72

164.67

12

10

0.1

20

20

2

0.31

10.29

135.46

12

10

0.1

20

20

4

0.31

7.44

101.29

12

10

1

20

20

1

0.31

1.27

27.27

12

10

1

20

20

2

0.31

1.03

24.35

12

10

1

20

20

4

0.31

0.74

20.93

12

10

10

20

20

1

0.31

-113.23

-1,346.78

12

10

10

20

20

2

0.31

-91.56

-1,086.77

12

10

10

20

20

4

0.31

-66.22

-782.64

N ote: w h en E j=25 an d E2=100, h /p = 0 . T his is an u n lik ely case and so h as been
om itted.

To determine p, the per gram retail price of heroin, one m ust
consider the type of market which is assum ed to exist pre
prohibition. M any possibilities exist. In this paper it is assumed
that a pre-prohibition market is one where no controls exist on
the supply of, and dem and for, heroin .6 In such a m arket p
represents the long run marginal and average cost of production
in a competitive market. Because of the prohibition, direct d a ta
on heroin production costs in a free Australian m arket do not
exist. Perhaps a reasonable estimate of p may be obtained from
information of the 'landed' price of heroin in Sydney, m ost of
which originates from East Asian countries where it is purchased
by importers and then on-sold to domestic wholesalers.
According to Dobinson and Poletti (1988), the purchase price
of 1 kg of 85% pure 7 heroin in Bangkok was $12000-$15000, or
$12-$15 per gram. The importer w ould then sell this kilogram of
heroin 'uncut' to a wholesaler in Sydney for $200-$250 per gram.
This massive gross return on the importation of heroin into
Australia m ost likely reflects both the risk premium which is
im posed by the importer and the preparedness of heroin
consumers, captured by their addiction, to pay.
The purchase price in Bangkok is also m ost likely inflated
because of the risks faced by the cultivators of opium and the
m anufacturers of heroin. In a free A ustralian heroin market,
production w ould be unencumbered by such risks. Suppliers
w ould be free to use the lowest cost production m ethods and
transportation costs to the major population centres w ould be
negligible. The efficiency gains available to domestic producers,
over those of South East Asia, due to the availability of
technologically advanced production methods and equipment
w ould probably outweigh the losses due to higher labour costs.
Hence we could expect that the wholesale price in a free domestic
m arket w ould be less than $12 per gram. However, w ithout more
specific information, w e assume that p =$12 per gram .8
9

The param eter n represents the reduction in heroin
consum ption due to the deterrent effect relative to that due to the
price effect. In Figure 1, n = (qa'-qa*)/ (qa-qa/)=l- As mentioned
previously this has been done for illustrative purposes only. If it
were the case that n < l, that is that the deterrent effect is less
than the price effect, then individuals would respond more to
price considerations than to m oral/legal ones9. The converse
w ould be the case if n> l. Little reliable information exists
regarding the strength of the deterrent effect relative to that of the
price effect for heroin. For estimation purposes we make three
assum ptions in turn, that the deterrent effect is much w eaker/the
same as/m u ch stronger than the price effect, that is th at
n= 0 .1 / n = l / n =10 respectively.
The param eter m represents the increase in external costs
caused by the prohibition induced price increase for heroin
relative to the decrease in external costs caused by the prohibition
induced deterrent effect. In Figure 1 m= Ae/BXZP. Once again
little reliable information exists regarding the m agnitude of m. If it
were the case that m > l then the increase in external costs caused
by the prohibition induced price increase w ould be greater than
the decrease in external costs caused by the deterrent effect.
Conversely for the case of m c l. The m agnitude of the heroin price
increase caused by the prohibition probably results in a large
increase in the num ber of crimes committed to finance addictions,
w ith associated spin-offs into police corruption, etc. Hence it is
plausible that m is greater than one. Nevertheless for estimation
purposes w e again assume in turn that m= 0 .1 , m = l and m = 10 .
The param eters Ej and E2 represent the marginal external cost
of heroin addiction per gram of heroin per unit time pre
prohibition, averaged over qa to qa' and qa' to qa* respectively. A
number of studies have attem pted to quantify the external costs
of heroin consumption10. Unfortunately these studies relate to
heroin consumption under prohibition and so are not particularly
10

useful here. M arks (1992) notes that the typical heroin addict
consumed approxim ately 98 grams of heroin in 1981. N aturally
this w ould have been at a relatively high per unit price.
Nevertheless if the dem and for heroin is own price inelastic then
w e may expect that the consumption level of a typical addict
faced w ith a free market price of $12 per gram might not be
proportionately greater. This point is reinforced by the fact th at
w hilst there m ust exist some minimum quantity of heroin which
m ust be consumed by an addict per unit time to satisfy her
addiction, there m ust also exist a maximum quantity compatible
w ith continued life. If it is the case that m ost addicts currently
consume quantities of heroin which are close to the minimum, and
if the gap between the minimum and maximum is not too great
then total heroin consumption levels m ay not increase
substantially w ith a free market for heroin.
This is supported by the findings of Miron and Zwiebel (1991)
concerning alcohol consumption in the United States during
prohibition. They conclude that "...while alcohol consumption
declined sharply at the onset of Prohibition, within several years
it rebounded to 60-70 percent of its initial value and did not
increase substantially immediately following the repeal o f Prohibition ",
(p.246, italics ours).
If this is the case then the typical heroin addict in a free heroin
m arket w ould be faced w ith an annual consumption cost which
w ould be quite comparable to that currently incurred by some
alcohol or tobacco consumers. Hence it is conceivable that the
crime component of recent estimates of the social cost of heroin
consumption w ould be greatly reduced11. This leaves external
costs associated w ith heroin overdoses12, automobile accidents,
reduced industrial productivity and the like. In this sense then it
is conceivable that the external costs of heroin consumption per
addict w ithin a free heroin market would be comparable to that
of a typical alcohol abuser.
11

Pogue and Sgontz (1989) conservatively estimate that external
alcohol abuse costs in the United States totalled $26.1 billion in
1983, an average of $127 per gallon of ethanol. This implies that
approxim ately 205.5 million gallons of ethanol were consumed by
alcohol abusers in 1984, w ho am ounted to about 10% of the adult
population. Hence in 1984 there were approxim ately 18 million
alcohol abusers in the United States w ho each consumed
approxim ately 11.4 gallons of ethanol and hence im posed, on
average, $1450 of external costs on society. If this figure is
applicable to the typical heroin addict in a free A ustralian market
consuming approxim ately 100 grams per year then, after
adjusting for inflation, Ei would be approxim ately $2013. Again
for the sake of simplicity we assume that Ei=E2.
A number of researchers have attem pted to estimate the own
price elasticity of dem and for heroin (see, for example, White and
Luksetich (1983) and Silverman and Spruill (1977)). It appears
that no generally accepted figure exists, although in a recent study
C. van Ours (1995) finds that the long term price elasticity for
opium use in the Dutch East Indies in 1923-38 was about -1.0.
Similar figures have been obtained w ith regard to the dem and for
tobacco and heavy gambling (see Becker, Grossman and Murphy
(1990) and Mobilia (1990) respectively). W hilst it is possible that
addicts and casual users are equally responsive to price changes,
it is likely that the latter are more responsive than the former. We
thus follow the approach of Pogue and Sgontz (1989) w ith regard
to alcohol and allow, in turn, riN/riA to take three possible values
in absolute terms: 1.0, 2.0 and 4.0.
M arks (1992) suggests that addicts consumed 2940kgs of
heroin whilst casual users consumed 900kgs of heroin (p.539).
W hilst these estimates w ere made w ith a prohibition in force, we
assum e that the proportional consumption of casual users to
addicts w ould be unchanged w ithout prohibition. We thus
assum e that Q n / Q a = 0.31.
12

These param eter estimates, and the subsequent calculations
presented in Table 1, m ust be treated w ith considerable caution
because of the many uncertainties and simplifications which the
preceding brief discussion has highlighted. Nevertheless, the
resultant values of h / p and h+p are presented in Table 1 where
the column heading for r|N/r|A is eln/ela.
The results of Table 1 suggest that the optimal per unit price
for heroin tinder prohibition lies in the range $165 to $-1347,
depending on the assum ed values for the various param eters in
equation (4). The lower bound of this range in particular requires
explanation. Also, it is im portant to ascertain the magnitude and
direction of the effects of variations in the param eter estimates on
the optimal price for heroin.
Firstly, 8 (h /p )/8 (r|N/r)A)<0, that is the more responsive to
heroin price changes are casual users than addicts, the lower the
optim al price. This is so because the greater the relative response
of casual users to heroin price increases, the greater the net loss of
consumer surplus and thus welfare because of prohibition
induced heroin price increases. Thus the greater this ratio, ceteris
paribus, the lower the optimal price.
Secondly, the greater the relative size of the price induced
increase in the external cost curve, m, the lower the optimal price,
ceteris paribus. This is so because a higher value for m implies that
price induced external costs of addiction, in the form of official
corruption and violence, etc., are higher for any given price
increase following the imposition of prohibition. Thus the optimal
price is lower.
Thirdly, the greater the relative size of the deterrent effect, n,
the greater the optimal price, ceteris paribus. This is so in this
model because the deterrent effect is assum ed to have no
consumer surplus implications. That is, consumer surplus losses
because of inw ards shifts of the dem and curves following
prohibition have, for the sake of simplicity, been ignored. Thus in
13

this model the deterrent effect is welfare enhancing because it
results in less consumption by addicts and hence less external
costs.
Finally, negative optimal prices, indicating that heroin
consumers should be subsidised, appear in the case of a very
large price induced shift in the external cost curve, that is when
m=10. This result should not be taken literally. Rather, it suggests
that, in the case where the propensity of addicts to commit
crimes to finance their addiction per unit heroin price increase is
large, and where much official corruption, etc., is likely to occur
per unit heroin price increase, heroin prices ought to be kept as
low as possible.
V POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In an attem pt to arrive at a policy relevant conclusion, w e make
some educated, perhaps conservative assumptions. Suppose th at
the vast majority of people respect and support official policy
regarding heroin, so that the deterrent effect is very strong (n= 10 ).
Suppose also that our law enforcement officials are also largely
incorruptible and that crimes committed by addicts are minor in
consequence (m=0.1). Finally, suppose that casual users are very
much more responsive to heroin price changes that are addicts
( t I n / t 1a = 4 ) . In this hypothetical situation the above analysis
suggests that the optimal price of heroin under prohibition in
A ustralia w ould be approximately $101 per gram. Recent black
m arket prices, whilst fluctuating significantly, seem to have
averaged approxim ately twice this figure. If this is the case then
the analysis presented in this paper suggests that the current
prohibition is being enforced too stringently, is creating an
excessive price for heroin, and so is resulting in net social welfare
losses14.
The approach taken in this paper to analyse the social welfare
14

effects of heroin consumption is necessarily simplistic and so
many limitations exist. As already mentioned many of the
param eter values used in the calculations of Table 1 are educated
guesses at best and ad-hoc at worst. If actual param eter values
are significantly different to those used in Table 1 then our
conclusions will need to be modified accordingly.
Also, the analysis assumes that addicts receive positive net
benefits from their heroin consumption in the form of consumer
surplus. It is equally plausible, however, to regard heroin
addiction as a disease. In this case the welfare of addicts would
be increased by reducing their consumption and so the optimal
price w ould be higher, ceteris paribus, than indicated in Table 1.
A nother criticism concerns the notion of consumer surplus. If
it is reasonable to argue that dem and reductions due to an official
policy of prohibition are welfare relevant then losses of consumer
surplus are greater than suggested in the above analysis and
hence optimal prices w ould be lower, ceteris paribus.
Perhaps the most im portant criticism is that our model is
static and short run in nature. It thus takes no account of the
dynamics of addiction formation and cessation as does the
m odel of Becker and M urphy (1988) for instance.
Despite these and other limitations we have attem pted to
analyse the social welfare implications of heroin consumption
under prohibition and conclude, tentatively, that the current
(black) m arket price of heroin is too high if one's objective is to
maximise social welfare.

15

Figure 1: A stylised heroin market with prohibition

(p+e)p
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NOTES

1 Medical authorities are permitted to manufacture or import small quantities
of heroin for research purposes only.
2 Another view is that heroin addicts are diseased and thus enjoy no consumer
surplus. In this case reducing their heroin consumption would increase their
welfare.
3 Willig (1976) has shown that under certain conditions consumer surplus is a
reasonable approximation of consumer welfare.
4 This simplification will result in overestimates of the welfare maximising
price of heroin.
5 It may in fact be the case that by declaring heroin a prohibited substance the
authorities actually make its consumption a more attractive activity for
addicts who may, on the whole, be risk loving. In this case n<0.
6 Other than the usual regulations protecting the interests o f minors, etc. Other
non-prohibition possibilities exist, such as a regulated market where heroin
could be legally supplied only by physicians and legally consumed only by
their patients. This sort of market for heroin existed in the UK during the
1950s.
7 This purity figure is from Elliot (1982), p. 16.
8 We ignore the issue of current pricing as no appropriate heroin price deflator
exists. In any case, given the size of the gross returns to heroin as it travels
down the distribution chain, concerns on the part of heroin dealers regarding
the erosion of purchasing power due to the general rate of inflation are likely
to be minimal.
9 See Cameron (1988) for a discussion of why the deterrent effect may be
weaker than commonly thought.
10 For instance, see Marks (1992).
11 There is some uncertainty regarding the direction of causality between heroin
addiction and crime. That is, whilst the common perception is that addicts
commit crimes to finance their addiction, many were criminals prior to their
addiction. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to assume that a significantly
lower price for heroin would be associated with less crime, given that heroin
is generally considered not to be criminogenic.
12 Most current cases of addicts dying from heroin overdoses seem to be caused
by uncertain heroin purity and/or quality. Presumably, in a free and open
market, this would be less of a problem.
13 We ignore exchange rate effects.
14 This conclusion is reinforced if prohibition enforcement costs are positive
and included in the calculus.
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